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POWER DEPENDENCE IN INDIVIDUAL BARGAINING: 
THE EXPECTED UTILITY OF INFLUENCE 
EDWARD J. LAWLER and SAMUEL B. BACHARACH 
EVERYDAY life is full of mixed-motive set-tings in which individuals must decide 
whether to attempt to influence others. The 
decision process in such situations is com-
plicated by the fact that any influence at-
tempt can have either of two opposite ef-
fects: it may overcome the resistance of the 
adversary and facilitate the actor's goal 
attainment or it may antagonize the adver-
sary and impede the goal attainment of the 
actor. Deciding whether to attempt influ-
This study examines the impact of certain dimen-
sions of dependence on the expected effectiveness of an 
influence attempt in a two-person bargaining situa-
tion. Assuming the role of employer, employee, or 
outside observer, 1,056 college students estimated the 
utility of an attempt by an employee to influence his 
employer with respect to a pay raise under various 
conditions of dependence. The results show that re-
spondents attributed greatest utility to the attempt 
when the employee had many alternatives (other job 
possibilities) and valued highly the outcomes at issue 
(a pay raise) and when the employer had few alterna-
tives (other workers) and ascribed low value to the 
outcomes. The authors find that the power-capability 
hypotheses derived from power-dependence theory are 
supported by the two outcome-alternative dimensions 
but not by the two outcome-value dimensions. The 
latter are found to support commitment hypotheses. 
Kdward J. I,aw lei is Associate Professor of Soci-
ology at The University of Iowa and Samuel B. Bach-
arach is Associate Professor of Organizational Be-
havior at the New York Slate School of Industrial 
and Labor Relations. The order of authorship of this 
paper does not reflect differential contributions; it 
lias been a truly joint endeavor. The authors would 
like to thank Stuart Freedman, Larry Haffner, Stuart 
Stover, and Pain Kline for assistance in the data col-
lection and analysis.—EDITOR 
ence therefore becomes a major dilemma for 
anyone who is in conflict or disagreement 
with an employer, spouse, neighbor, ally, 
or even enemy. This study is concerned with 
how actors "cognitively" handle this di-
lemma, that is, how they use situational cues 
to judge the expected utility of an influence 
attempt in a situation of conflict or disagree-
ment.1 Specifically, the research investigates 
the processes through which actors select 
and use information about a bargaining 
situation, involving an employer and an 
employee, to estimate the magnitude and 
probability of payoff from an influence 
attempt. 
The cognitive focus of this research dis-
tinguishes it from most social psychological 
research on conflict. Such research typically 
adopts a behavioral focus and neglects the 
cognitive processes underlying the behav-
ior. While there obviously are good reasons 
for a behavioral focus, it has led to some 
rather glaring gaps in the existing literature 
and made the application of experimental 
research to the real world more problematic 
than it need be. Treatments of expected 
utility are a notable example. At this point, 
we know that expected utility affects a 
variety of behavior (such as coalition forma-
tion and compliance), but we know very 
'The term "cognition" refers to the mental activity 
through which individuals interpret or come to under-
stand a situation. The term, applied to estimated 
utility in the present study, refers to the mental activ-
ity that intervenes between situational cues or informa-
tion and an individual's subsequent behavior. 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 32, No. 2 (January 1979). © 1979 by Cornell University. 
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little about how actors use situational or 
informational cues to estimate expected 
utility. The importance of this gap becomes 
clearer if we compare laboratory settings for 
studying utility with "real world" settings. 
In most laboratory experiments, actors are 
given concrete, relatively perfect informa-
tion on the utility attached to a behavior, 
and the rate or frequency of their behavior is 
then observed.2 Such experiments provide 
valuable information on the behavioral 
effects of utility but no information on how 
individuals might use incomplete or am-
biguous information about a situation to 
form estimates of utility. 
In the "real world" actors seldom have 
complete or perfect information upon 
which to estimate the utility of an influence 
attempt; they must infer utilities from in-
complete, ambiguous information regard-
ing any bargaining situation and must, 
therefore, rely heavily on cognitive judg-
ments to assimilate and syncretize the utili-
tarian implications of available informa-
tion. Consequently, to apply laboratory 
research on the effects of utility to the "real 
world," we must understand more than the 
effects of utility on behavior; we must also 
understand how actors appraise various 
aspects of a bargaining situation to form 
utility estimates. 
This study uses power-dependence theory 
as a framework for examining whether and 
how parties use information on each other's 
dependence to estimate the utility of an 
influence attempt.3 The effect of depend-
ence on expected utilities is investigated in 
an employee-employer context in which the 
employee (or potential influencer) is de-
ciding whether to pressure the employer (or 
2S. Lynnc Ofshe and Richard J. Ofshc, Utility and 
Choice in Social Interaction (Englcwood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 21-30; James T. Tedeschi, 
Thomas V. Bonoina, and Barry R. Schlenker, "Influ-
ence, Decision, and Compliance," in J. T. Tedeschi, 
ed., Social Influence Processes (Chicago: Aldine-
Atherton, 1972), pp. 346-404; Sidney Siegel, Choice, 
Strategy, and Utility (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961); 
Richard E. Wallon and Robert B. McKersie, A Be-
havioral Theory of Labor Negotiations (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965). 
'Robert M. Emerson, "Social Exchange Theory," 
Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 2 (1976), pp. 335-62; 
Peter Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life (New 
York: Wiley, 1964), pp. 115-25. 
potential target of influence) for a pay raise. 
Within this context, power-dependence 
theory provides a backdrop for specifying 
the impact of various dimensions of depend-
ence on the (subjective) expected utility of 
an employee influence attempt. Before 
discussing power-dependence theory, we 
will use decision theory to conceptualize 
"utility," the dependent variable. 
Based on decision theory, the simplest and 
most generally accepted definition of ex-
pected utility is the magnitude of outcomes 
expected to result from certain behavior 
weighted by the expected probability that 
those outcomes will result from the behavior 
(magnitude x probability).4 From this cen-
tral idea a number of variants have been 
developed incorporating additional aspects 
of expected utility. For example, in addition 
to the magnitude and probability variables, 
Ofshe and Ofshe include equity as an aspect 
of utility and Siegel adds behavior varia-
bility (avoidance of boredom).5 The present 
research focuses solely on the central idea: 
magnitude x probability. 
The implication of decision theory is that 
outcome magnitude and probability are 
the foci of the actor's utility judgments. 
That is, actors' impressions of and infer-
ences regarding the bargaining situation 
should be summarized, transformed, and 
crystallized into overall estimates of the 
outcome probability and outcome mag-
nitude that would result from an influence 
attempt. With reference to the present study, 
therefore, the expected utility of an in-
fluence attempt lies not in the perceived 
magnitude of the prospective pay raise 
alone but in the product of the anticipated 
magnitude and anticipated probability of a 
pay raise. Unlike research that gives actors 
the magnitude and probability levels and 
Ofshe and Ofshe, Utility and Choice in Social 
Interaction, pp. 21-30; Siegel, Choice, Strategy, and 
Utility, pp. 9-10; Tedeschi, Bonoma, and Schlenker, 
"Influence, Decision, and Compliance"; Anthony 
Heath, Rational Choice and Social Exchange (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 13-14; 
Gcdwin C. Chu, "Fear Arousal, Efficacy, and Im-
minency," Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy, Vol. 4, No. 5 (November 1966), pp. 517-24. 
Ofshe and Ofshe, Utility and Choice in Social 
Interaction, pp. 21-30; Sidney Siegel, Choice, Strategy, 
and Utility, pp. 9-10. 
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then observes their behavior, the present 
research examines the situational cues from 
which individuals infer probability and 
magnitude levels. 
Power-Dependence Theory 
Power-dependence theory is a useful basis 
for analyzing the process through which 
actors estimate the utility of an influence 
attempt. Although the theory does not con-
tain explicit statements regarding this 
process, implications regarding the effects 
of dependence can be drawn from it. With 
the use of axioms, this paper will elaborate 
and systematize the implications of power-
dependence theory. 
First, power-dependence theory identi-
fies the major dimensions of dependence as 
outcome alternatives and value. Alterna-
tives refer to the availability of outcomes 
from other relationships, and value to the 
"importance of" or "need for" theoutcomes 
in question.6 Applied to the employee-
employer context, there are two alternative 
dimensions (alternative jobs for the em-
ployee and alternative workers for the em-
ployer) and two value dimensions (the im-
portance of a pay raise to the employee and 
the importance to the employer of avoiding 
a pay raise). 
In addition, the theory suggests that 
actors will use the dimensions of depend-
ence to estimate each other's power capa-
bility (potential power). Specifically, the 
employee's power capability will be per-
ceived as greater (and the employer's as 
lower) when the employer has few alterna-
tives or highly values the outcomes at issue, 
and the employee has many alternatives or 
ascribes low value to the outcomes at stake. 
These implications of power-dependence 
theory for the perception of power are sup-
ported in a recent study.7 Bacharach and 
6Rolx;it M. Emerson, "Exchange Theory Part I: A 
Psychological Basis for Social Exchange," in Joseph 
Berger, Morris Zelditch, and Bo Anderson (eds.), 
Sociological Theories in Progress, Vol. 2 (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1972), pp. 38-57; Blau, Exchange 
and Power in Social Life, pp. 115-25; John VV. Thibaut 
and Harold H. Kelley, The Social Psychology of 
Groups (New York: Wiley, 1959), pp. 100-01. 
'Samuel B. Bacharach and Edward J. Lawler, "The 
Perception of Power," Social Forces, Vol. 55, No. 3 
(September 1976), pp. 123-31 
Lawler observed that a person in the em-
ployee position uses the dimensions of 
dependence to infer self's and other's (em-
ployer) power capability in a manner con-
sistent with power-dependence theory. 
The results of the Bacharach and Lawler 
study of power perceptions can be subsumed 
under a single axiom, which provides a 
starting point for predicting the effects of 
dependence on the perception of utility: 
Axiom 1: If Employee's dependence on 
Employer decreases (or Employer's 
dependence on Employee increases), 
then the power capability attributed to 
Employee will increase and the power 
capability attributed to Employer will 
decrease. 
To deduce predictions regarding expected 
utilities, however, it is necessary to postulate 
a relationship between attributed power 
capabilities and the perceived utility of an 
influence attempt. Such a postulate is 
reasonable because various studies docu-
ment the fact that influence attempts are 
generally more effective when they are 
butuessed by high-power capabilities.8 
Keeping the cognitive focus of the present 
research in mind, Axiom 2 suggests that 
actors will perceive such a connection be-
tween power capabilities and the utility of 
an influence attempt. 
Axiom 2: If there is an increase in the 
power capability attributed to 
Employee (or a decrease in the power 
capability attributed to Employer), 
then there will be an increase in the sub-
jective expected utility of an Employee 
influence attempt. 
This research focuses on a theorem de-
rived from these two axioms, which suggests 
that a change in any of the alternative or 
value dimensions of dependence will pro-
duce a corresponding change in the utility 
atU'ibuted to an influence attempt: 
77i<?orem://Emp/o)><?e'.sdependenceon 
Employer decreases (or Employer's 
dependence on Employee increases), 
"Jeffrey A. Rubin and Bert Brown, The Social Psy-
chology of Bargaining and Negotiation (New York: 
Academic Press, 1975), pp. 213-21. 
POWER DEPENDENCE IN INDIVIDUAL BARGAINING 199 
then there will be an increase in the sub-
jective expected utility of an Employee 
influence attempt. 
Four specific hypotheses based on this 
theorem will be tested in this research. The 
expected utility of an employee's influence 
attempt will be greater (1) when the em-
ployee has many rather than few alterna-
tives (decrease in employee's dependence), 
(2) when the employer has few rather than 
many alternatives (increase in employer's 
dependence), (3) when the employee as-
cribes low rather than high value (impor-
tance) to the outcomes at issue (decrease in 
employee's dependence), and (4) when the 
employer ascribes high rather than low 
value (importance) to the outcomes at issue 
(increase in employer's dependence). These 
four hypotheses are based on the power-
capability rationale; they assume that in-
dividuals will make power-capability infer-
ences from the dimensions of dependence 
and use these inferences to estimate the 
utility of an influence attempt. 
Although research documents that in-
dividuals make power-capability inferences 
from information on outcome value and 
alternatives,9 it is also possible that they 
consider the attitudinal commitment of an 
actor to the outcomes at stake. For example, 
individuals might infer that an employee 
who highly values the outcomes at stake will 
be very committed to influencing the em-
ployer and that an employer who highly 
values the outcomes will be very committed 
to resisting influence attempts by the em-
ployee. Thus, either the power-capability or 
commitment implications of outcome value 
could be used to estimate the utility of an 
influence attempt. 
The direction of the outcome-value ef-
fects on the utility expectation will depend 
on the relative weight given the power-
capability and commitment implications 
of information on outcome value. If the 
power-capability implications are accorded 
the greater weight, then the research should 
support hypotheses 3 and 4. If, on the other 
hand, the commitment implications of 
outcome value are judged more salient, then 
9Bacliarach and Lawler, "The Perception of Power." 
the effects of outcome value on expected 
utility should be the reverse of hypotheses 
3 and 4: greater utility should be attributed 
to an influence attempt when the em-
ployee's value is high instead of low and 
when the employer's value is low instead of 
high. These contradictory hypotheses are 
plausible because actors who are highly 
committed (high value) to the outcomes at 
stake might be expected to invest greater 
resources (such as time and effort) to combat 
the opponents' resistance. An employee 
with high value may invest more resources 
to gain a pay raise, and the employer with 
high value may invest more resources to 
block a pay raise. It is our intention to de-
termine whether the power-capability or 
commitment implications of outcome value 
are more important in individuals' pre-
dictions of the utility of an influence 
attempt. 
Method 
A role-playing method was used to ma-
nipulate the four dependence dimensions: 
employee's alternatives (jobs), employee's 
value, employer's alternatives (workers), 
and employer's value.10These four variables 
'"Although this method contains substantial arti-
ficiality, like that encountered in laboratory studies, 
it has a number of advantages over laboratory studies 
for research in perception or cognition. First, a larger 
number of subjects and a larger experimental design 
can be employed with a questionnaire without much 
loss of experimental control. Second, despite the 
artificiality, the major elements of "real world" set-
tings can still be built into the role-playing setting. 
Just as people in everyday sellings use information 
about the situation to make inferences about them-
selves and others, so do the subjects in our experiment. 
The "information processing" present in the real 
world is also present in our experiment. The difference 
is thai we have selected certain aspects of the situation 
and certain inferences to isolate and examine in our 
experimental setting. 
One of the major problems with a role-playing 
method is that subjects may differ in the amount of 
experience they have had in the context portrayed 
within the study. We would expect most subjects 
(college students) to have some experience (direct or 
vicarious) with employee-employer situations, but the 
type and degree of experience could vary across sub-
jects. As long as one randomly assigns subjects to 
experimental conditions, however, such differential 
experience could not account for significant differ-
ences among the experimental conditions. In fact, the 
variance in subjects' cognitions that is due to differ-
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were manipulated as high versus low in a 
2 x 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design. A total of 1,056 
students from two Northeastern universities 
were randomly assigned to one of the 16 
experimental treatments. The roles of the 
respondents (perceivers) were counter-
balanced within experimental conditions. 
One-third of the respondents within each 
experimental condition took the role of the 
employee, one-third took the role of the 
employer, and one-third took the role of a 
third party observing the employer-em-
ployee altercation. Across these role stand-
points, respondents estimated the utility of 
an employee influence attempt (the per-
ceived probability and magnitude of a pay 
raise resulting from an influence attempt). 
This role counterbalance assures that any 
effects of dependence cannot be attributed 
to a particular role and enables a test for 
interactions by role. The presentation of the 
procedures and results places the reader in 
the observer position. The only difference 
among the role conditions was in the words 
used to refer to persons in each role. 
The procedures called for respondents to 
read a description of a hypothetical situa-
tion and then to complete a questionnaire. 
The description portrayed an employee-
employer conflict over pay raises. The em-
ployer (manager-owner of a clothing store), 
who had not recently given pay raises lo the 
employees (salespersons), was in the process 
of deciding whether to allot increases 
through commissions. Respondents were 
told that the employer was currently leaning 
against raises but would make the final 
decision about two weeks hence. Under-
standing that it would be impossible to 
change the employer's mind once the pay-
raise decision were made, the employee 
was faced with deciding whether to attempt 
to influence his employer in the interim 
period. Within this context, respondents 
(in employee, employer, or observer role) 
were asked to estimate the utility of an em-
ployee influence attempt. 
The description of the situation also 
contained information manipulating the 
cntiul experience with comparable "real world" situa-
tions should reduce the probability of finding signifi-
cant effects for the manipulated variables. 
four dependence dimensions. The avail-
ability of alternative jobs for the employee 
and alternative workers for the employer 
manipulated the two outcome-alternative 
dimensions. Specifically, the employee's 
alternatives manipulation stated: "The job 
market for salespersons, like the employee 
(you), is very poor (very good), and there is 
only a 10% (a 90%) chance that the employee 
(you) could find a better job." The manipu-
lation of the employer's alternatives stated: 
"The employer (you) would find it difficult 
(easy) to replace the employee (you) because 
there is only a 10% (a 90%) chance that the 
employer (you) could hire another person 
with the employee's (your) qualifications." 
Outcome value was manipulated by 
varying the importance of getting pay raises 
(for employees) or avoiding pay raises (for 
employers). Specifically, the employee's 
value manipulation stated: "A pay raise is 
not at all important (very important) to the 
employee because the employee's (your) 
financial situation has greatly improved 
(seriously deteriorated) in the last year. 
Similarly, the employer's value was manip-
ulated by the following statement: "It is not 
at all important (very important) that the 
employer (you) avoid pay raises because 
the store's financial situation was greatly 
improved (seriously deteriorated) in the last 
year." Thus, both the employee and the 
employer had information on each other's 
dependence situation. 
Dependent Variable 
A questionnaire, containing the depend-
ence measures, followed the description of 
the situation. Respondents were instructed 
lo read the hypothetical situation twice 
before proceeding to the questionnaire. 
(This process was intended to equalize 
respondents' understanding of the situation 
and reduce any differences in understanding 
due to reading-comprehension ability.) 
Respondents were told that there were no 
right or wrong answers on the question-
naire, and that the research was only con-
cerned with their personal opinions. 
The measure of utility expectation was 
derived from respondents' estimate of the 
probability and magnitude of a pay raise. 
The perceived probability of a pay raise, 
POWER DEPENDENCE IN INDIVIDUAL BARGAINING 201 
given an influence attempt (Probllnfl), 
was measured by the following item: "If the 
employee tries (you try) to influence the 
employer (you), how likely is it that the 
employer (you) will give the employee (you) 
a pay raise?" Subjects responded on a nine-
point scale labeled "not at all likely" at the 
low end and "highly likely" at the high end. 
The perceived magnitude of the pay raise, 
given an influence attempt (Magllnfl), was 
based on an item stating, "If the employee 
tries (you try) to influence the employer 
(you), and the employer gives (you give) a 
pay raise to the employee (you), how large 
or small would you expect the pay raise to 
be?" Subjects responded on a nine-point 
scale labeled "very small" at the low end and 
"very large" at the high end. The expected 
utility of influence was measured by multi-
plying the probability and magnitude 
estimates: utility = (Probllnfl) x(Magllnfl). 
To assure ourselves that respondents 
understood the description of the situation, 
an ancillary questionnaire item was in-
cluded inquiring how easy or difficult it was 
to understand. Respondents answered on a 
nine-point scale with higher numbers 
reflecting greater understanding. They 
reported considerable understanding of the 
situation: across experimental conditions, 
the mean level was 7.0 on the nine-point 
scale. 
Results 
The hypotheses stated earlier make pre-
dictions regarding the effect of each depend-
ence dimension on the expected utility of an 
influence attempt. After detailing the major 
effects found, we will examine ancillary 
results regarding the effects of the respond-
ents' role and sex. 
The table presents the mean values for 
expected utility by experimental condition. 
A five-way analysis of variance (2x2x2x2 
x 3, including role) reveals a main effect for 
each dependence dimension and an inter-
action effect between the two outcome-
alternative dimensions. The main effects 
of the two outcome-alternative dimensions 
are consistent with the power-capability 
hypotheses: the expected utility was greater 
when the employee had many, rather than 
few, alternatives (F( 1,1008) = 26.94, p<.01; 
w2 = .023) and when the employer had few, 
rather than many, alternatives (F(l,1008) 
= 58.13, p< .001; w2 = .05). An inter-
action effect shows, however, that the effect 
of the two outcome-alternative dimensions 
is multiplicative rather than additive 
(F(l,1008) = 26.94, p<.001; w2 = .023). 
Post-hoc (pairwise) comparisons, using 
Tukey's HSD (Honestly Significant Differ-
ence), reveal that the expected utility was 
higher in the high employee alternatives-
low employer alternatives condition than in 
Table. The (Subjective) Expected Utility of an Influence Attempt 
by Dimensions of Dependence." 
Employer 
Low Valui' 
Low Alternatives 
High Alternatives 
High Value 
Low Alternatives 
High Alternatives 
Low 
Low 
Alternatives 
19.99 
17.53 
13.67 
11.50 
Employ) 
Value 
High 
Alternatives 
28.69 
19.61 
19.41 
10.02 
L'C 
High Vali 
Low 
Alternatives 
23.94 
22.26 
15.36 
15.09 
lie 
High 
Alternatives 
29.12 
21.95 
23.77 
14.80 
"Larger number means higher expected utility. 
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any of the other conditions (all p's <.01). 
In other words, the expected utility of an 
employee influence attempt was highest 
when the employee had many alternatives 
and the employer had few. In sum, the 
results for outcome alternatives support a 
refined version of the hypotheses drawn 
from power-dependence theory. 
The main effects for the two outcome-
value dimensions support the commitment 
rather than the power-capability hypoth-
eses. The utility of an influence attempt was 
greater when the employee attached high 
rather than low value to the outcomes at 
issue (F(l,1008) = 22.97, p < .001; w* = 
.02); and the expected utility was greater 
when the employer accorded low rather than 
high value to the outcomes (F( 1,1008 = 
121.13, p < .001; w* = .11). There were 
no interactions. Individuals apparently 
infer an actor's commitment to expend 
resources from their perception of the actor's 
outcome value and then adjust their evalua-
tion of utilities accordingly. 
The expected-utility measure multiplies 
respondents' estimates of probability and 
magnitude. It is possible, therefore, that an 
effect on either perceived probability or 
perceived magnitude could produce the 
foregoing effects. To examine this possi-
bility, separate analyses of variance were 
done on the perceived probability and per-
ceived magnitude of a pay raise. The results 
indicated that each dimension of depend-
ence affected both the perceived probability 
and perceived magnitude of the pay raise 
associated with influence (all p's < .001) in 
a manner consistent with the aforemen-
tioned findings. 
Respondents estimated the utility of an 
employee influence attempt from one of 
the following standpoints: the employee, 
the employer, or an observer. The results 
show a role main effect indicating that 
persons in the observer role attributed some-
what less utility to an employee influence 
attempt than persons in either the employee 
or employer role (F( 1,1008) = 12.84, p < .001; 
w2 = .02 (Ms = 16.9 for observer, 19.5 for 
employee, and 21.1 for employer)). Observ-
ers, who are without a stake in the employee-
employer conflict, are apparently less op-
timistic about the effectiveness of influence 
than persons more directly involved in the 
conflict. 
In addition to the role main effect, a few 
interactions by role occur. These inter-
actions do not alter or limit the effects of the 
dependence dimensions, and together they 
add less than a total of 2 percent to the vari-
ance explained. It appears that respondents 
in different roles used the dimensions of 
dependence in a similar manner to estimate 
the utility of an employee influence attempt. 
An analysis of variance including the 
respondents' sex as a factor reveals no main 
effects or by-sex interactions. Hence, males 
and females used the dimensions of depend-
ence similarly to make judgments. 
Discussion 
The central theoretical contribution of 
this study is to the power-dependence liter-
ature. The importance of cognition in con-
flict settings requires documentation of how 
individuals use the "objective" features of 
the environment to "define the situation." 
If it can be shown that people use the "ob-
jective" criteria of dependence to make 
cognitive judgments that are important to 
conflict behavior, then the potential value 
of power-dependence theory should be en-
hanced. This research affirms respondents' 
use of dependence dimensions to estimate 
utilities but also demonstrates that the direc-
tion of the effects is not fully consistent with 
the power-capability hypotheses derived 
from power-dependence theory. 
A prior study with similar research pro-
cedures indicates that actors use the dimen-
sions of dependence to estimate power 
capabilities in a manner consistent with the 
theory.11 Given that the dependence dimen-
sions reveal the predicted effects (Axiom 1) 
on perceptions of power capabilities, one 
would also expect to confirm the power-
capability hypotheses regarding (subjec-
tive) expected utilities. A change in the 
dependence of either actor would presum-
ably engender similar effects on both power-
capability estimates and attributions of 
utility to an influence attempt. However, 
"Bacharach and Lawlcr, "The Perception of 
Power." 
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while the results show that respondents use 
all four dimensions of dependence to make 
utility estimates, only partial support is 
accorded the specific predictions of power-
dependence theory. 
In the case of the two outcome-alternative 
dimensions, the results support the theory 
but suggest a multiplicative rather than an 
additive effect. Specifically, the expected 
utility of an employee influence attempt 
increases only when the employee has many 
alternatives and the employer has few alter-
natives. Overall, the interaction of the two 
outcome-alternative dimensions suggests 
that respondents consider two conditions 
necessary for successful influence in an 
employee-employer situation: (a) the in-
fluencer (employee) must be able to leave 
the relationship, perhaps avoiding retalia-
tion or punishment, and (b) the target of 
influence (employer) must not be able to 
leave the relationship without cost. Accord-
ing to power-dependence theory, these two 
conditions provide the maximum power 
advantage to the employee. 
Furthermore, the two conditions have 
important tactical implications. The tactic 
of cultivating more alternatives will not 
enhance the perceived influence of an em-
ployee if the employer has many alterna-
tives. The respondents indicated that an 
expectation of successful influence requires 
simultaneous increases in the employee 
alternatives and decreases in the employer 
alternatives. Given that collective action is 
often necessary to alter the employer's 
alternatives, the interaction between the 
outcome-alternative dimensions appears 
to provide one basis for employee efforts to 
organize rather than rely on individual 
action. 
While the effects of the outcome alterna-
tive dimensions support a refined or more 
specified version of power-dependence 
theory, the results for outcome-value dimen-
sions are consistent with the commitment 
hypotheses rather than the power-capability 
(power-dependence) ones. Specifically, 
respondents attribute greater probabilities 
and magnitudes of pay to an influence 
attempt when the influencer (employee) 
values the outcomes at issue highly or when 
the target of influence (employer) ascribes 
them low value. This is important because 
it suggests that different dimensions of de-
pendence may have different implications 
for actors in a conflict setting. . 
Results supporting the commitment 
hypotheses suggest that an actor (either 
influencer or target of influence) is con-
fronted with an important dilemma if the 
opponent highly values the outcomes at 
issue. One the one hand, the ability of the 
actor to effect outcomes highly valued by the 
opponent should provide a base (power 
capability) for maximizing influence;12 on 
the other hand, the actor might anticipate 
an increase in the opponent's commitment 
to achieve or block influence when highly 
valued outcomes are involved.13 The man-
ner in which this dilemma is resolved will 
determine the nature of the outcome-value 
effect on expected utilities in a conflict set-
ting. The present study indicates that actors 
give greater weight to the commitment 
implications of outcome value than to the 
power-dependence ones when estimating 
the utility of an influence attempt. 
Future research should further specify the 
conditions under which actors draw differ-
ent inferences from outcome-alternative and 
outcome-value dimensions. The fact that 
there are often multiple outcomes at stake 
in a conflict situation raises some important 
questions. For example, will the inferences 
(power-capability versus commitment) 
depend on the centrality of the outcomes to 
the conflict? In the present study, only one 
outcome continuum (pay) was included, 
and it was the central focus of the conflict. It 
is conceivable that commitment inferences 
will be drawn primarily from information 
on outcomes that are central to the alterca-
tion because these outcomes are the major 
source of the conflict. Other outcomes, 
l2Emerson, "Power-Dependence Relations," and 
"Exchange Theory Part 1"; Bacharach and Lawler, 
"Perception of Power." 
"Edward J. Lawler and Samuel B. Bacharach, 
"Outcome Alternatives and Value As Criteria for 
Mullitactic Evaluations," Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, Vol. 34, No. 5 (November 1976), 
pp. 885-91; Samuel B. Bacharach and Edward J. Law-
ler, "Subjective Prediction of Behavior in a Conflict 
Setting: A Power-Dependence Approach," unpub-
lished manuscript. 
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highly valued but less central to the conflict, 
may be viewed as a source of power and 
reveal the power-capability effects on ex-
pected utility. That is, other outcomes 
valued by the opponent may be seen as a 
means to influence the opponent's stance 
on the central ones at stake in the conflict. 
Thus, information on different (independ-
ent) outcome continua may have somewhat 
different effects on the expected utility of an 
influence attempt. 
Given the existence of these multiple-
outcome continua, however, it is also im-
portant to ask how individuals will weigh 
and combine dependence information on 
these disparate outcomes to arrive at overall 
utility estimates. One possibility is that they 
will weigh information on the most central 
outcomes more heavily than that on less 
cenual ones. If so, information on different 
outcome continua could have divergent 
implications (power-capability versus 
commitment), but overall utility judgments 
may primarily reflect information on the 
most central ones, suggesting results like 
those found in this research. These issues 
should be addressed in future research. 
To summarize, this research demonstrates 
that actors use the dimensions of depend-
ence specified by power-dependence theory 
to estimate the expected utility of an influ-
ence attempt in an individual bargaining 
situation. On a more general level, the 
effects suggest that power-capability and 
commitment are important aspects of the 
process through which individuals syn-
thesize situational cues and use these cues 
to estimate utilities. Future research, aside 
from pursuing the effects of dependence, 
should identify other situational cues that 
bear on actors' power-capability and com-
mitment inferences. These inferences and 
their relation to (subjective) expected util-
ities are not inextricably bound up with the 
dimensions of dependence. Any aspect of the 
bargaining situation (such as level of con-
flict, interpersonal demeanor, or threat 
capabilities) that individuals use to infer 
power capabilities or commitment should 
have a similar effect on the estimated utility 
of an influence attempt. In closing, it should 
be noted that the examination of the effect 
of power dependence on the estimates of 
expected utility is only one step in a needed 
integration between power-dependence 
theory and the tactics of bargaining. 
